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As	envisioned	in	his	election	manifesto	and	soon	after	being	elevated	as	the	new	President	of	
Afghanistan,	 Ashraf	 Ghani	 issued	 a	 legislative	 decree	 to	 reform	 public	 procurement	 of	
Afghanistan	 (Ghani,	 2014).	 The	 reform	was	 initiated	by	merging	 the	existing	procurement	
entities	and	establishing	a	central	regulatory	body,	the	National	Procurement	Authority	(AoP,	
2014).	 It	 came	 at	 a	 time	 when	 the	 prolonged	 and	 disputed	 presidential	 election	 caused	
massive	delays	to	the	procurement	process	of	development	projects.	
	
For	a	newly	formed	entity	it	was	challenging	to	both	establish	and	operate	at	the	same	time.		
Clearing	 the	 massive	 backlog	 of	 procurement,	 responding	 to	 the	 demands	 of	 both	 the	
procurement	entities	and	the	donors	in	terms	of	proceeding	with	the	procurement	of	new	
projects,	and	dealing	with	the	urgent	need	of	security	sector’s	fuel	and	food	contracts	can	be	
enumerated	as	major	challenges.	
	
What	has	changed?		
This	 institutional	 reform	was	not	warmly	welcomed	 initially	by	many	 including	politicians,	
legislatures,	bureaucrats,	and	donors.	It	was	considered	to	be	centralization	of	authority	by	
the	 Office	 of	 the	 President.	 While	 comparing	 the	 pre	 and	 post	 reform	 organizational	
structure,	centralization	of	authority	is	less	apparent.	A	special	procurement	commission	to	
approve	above	threshold	contracts,	Afghanistan	Reconstruction	and	Development	Services	
(ARDS)	to	facilitate	procurement	processes,	and	Procurement	Policy	Unit	to	formulate	and	
provide	 policy	 guidance	 were	 functioning	 previously	 in	 the	 public	 procurement	 sector	 of	
Afghanistan	(Ministry	of	Justice,	2008).	
	
The	 functions	 of	 the	National	 Procurement	Authority	 (NPA)	 are	 adequately	 similar	 to	 the	
former	structure	in	terms	of	authority	distribution,	hierarchical	arrangement,	and	contracts	
award	authority	(NPA,	2016).	The	reform	principally	addressed	the	key	flaws	of	the	former	
dispersed	organizational	structure:	lack	of	coordination,	duplication	of	responsibilities,	and	
spread	out	functions	(OECD,	2008)	that	have	not	only	caused	hindrance	for	the	procurement	
entities	but	resulted	in	reduced	efficiency	and	effectiveness	of	the	procurement	processes.		
	
What	has	achieved?		
The	 political	 and	 programmatic	 success	 of	 public	 procurement	 reform	 has	 been	
acknowledged	 both	 domestically	 and	 internationally.	 Afghanistan’s	 commitments	 to	 the	
Tokyo	Mutual	Accountability	Framework	(TMAF)	and	renewed	commitments	at	the	London	
Conference	on	Afghanistan	2014	were	greatly	concentrated	on	reforms	and	as	wished-for,	
this	reform	has	satisfied	its	aimed	onlookers	particularly	the	international	community.	NPA’s	
focus	 on	 increasing	 efficiency,	 effectiveness	 and	 value	 for	 money	 by	 meritocratic	
appointments	and	the	introduction	of	transparent	and	accountable	systems	have	played	an	
important	role	in	achieving	its	intended	objectives.	United	States’	Special	Inspector	General	
for	Afghanistan	Reconstruction	SIGAR’s	recent	report	to	the	U.S	Congress	recognized	these	
steps	encouraging	in	the	fight	against	corruption	(SIGAR,	2017).	Transparency	International	
calls	it	a	“One	bright	spot”	in	the	government’s	fight	against	corruption	by	saving	more	than	
$200	million	 that	might	 have	 been	 lost	 to	 corruption	 (Transparency	 International,	 2016).	
Afghanistan	has	also	scored	well	in	World	Bank’s	2016	benchmarking	public	procurement	in	
both	 thematic	 areas	 of	 procurement	 lifecycle	 and	 complaint	 and	 reporting	 mechanisms	
(World	 Bank,	 2016).	 Furthermore,	 Afghanistan’s	 score	 in	 Transparency	 International’s	 CPI	
index	has	also	witnessed	a	significant	improvement	in	2016	compare	to	the	earlier	four	years.		
The	recent	agreement	on	 implementing	Open	Contracting	Data	Standards	(OCDS)	will	also	
increase	transparency	through	increased	community	engagement	and	citizens’	participation.				
	
Whose	benefits	are	at	stake?		
Public	procurement	is	politically	sensitive	because	of	substantial	public	money	involvement.	
In	 Afghanistan,	 the	 main	 causes	 and	 practices	 of	 corruption	 varies	 from	 administrative	
corruption,	clientelism	and	patronage	to	low	pay	and	bribery	(Singh,	2016).	Corrupt	parasitic	
and	monopolistic	networks	within	and	outside	governments	are	mostly	those	affected	by	the	
anti-corruption	reforms.	Resistance	to	this	reform	can	be	divided	into	two	broad	categories.	
The	first	category	is	street	level	bureaucrats	who	demonstrate	rigidity	not	due	to	personal	
interest	but	because	of	historical	inertia	and	no	willingness	to	change.	The	second	category	
are	those	whose	personal	interests	are	at	stake.	These	include	elite	and	influential	public	and	
private	actors	both	within	and	outside	government.	
	
Afghanistan,	 unfortunately	where	 corruption	 is	 systematic	 and	 embedded	 in	 political	 and	
economic	 systems,	 sustainable	 anti-corruption	 reform	 is	 a	 pre-requisite	 to	 sustainable	
development.	 Close	 coordination	 and	 regular	 communication	 between	 the	 procurement	
entities	and	as	a	whole	the	government	institutions	can	play	an	important	role	in	increasing	
accessibility	and	reducing	political	and	bureaucratic	blame	games.	Moreover,	addressing	a	
single	element	in	isolation	to	other	institutional	pillars	of	a	national	integrity	system	(Pope,	
2000)	cannot	guarantee	success	but	reforms	shall	be	initiated	under	a	unified	reform	strategy.	
The	 reform	 strategy	 needs	 to	 consider	 certain	 institutional	 pillars	 such	 as	 judiciary,	 civil	
service,	watchdog	agencies,	 civil	 society	and	others	 in	order	 to	prevent	corruption	at	 first	
place	rather	than	relying	on	penalties	after	the	event.	Countries	where	corruption	is	worse,	
alongside	 institutional	 reforms,	 social	 empowerment	 is	 equally	 important	 and	 can	 play	 a	
critical	 role	 in	 the	 fight	 against	 corruption	 (Johnston,	 1998).	 Engaging	 civil	 society	 and	
providing	public	access	to	documents	can	also	add	value	to	the	reform	initiatives	and	assist	
the	state	in	gaining	trust	and	increasing	legitimacy	in	the	eyes	of	its	people.	
	
President	Ghani’s	efforts	of	fight	against	corruption	are	paying	off	in	terms	of	regaining	the	
trust	of	international	community	by	demonstrating	strong	political	will	to	root	out	corruption	
from	 Afghanistan	 and	 to	 increase	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 foreign	 aids.	 However,	 continuous	
support	of	the	international	community	is	essential	in	order	to	sustain	these	reforms.	
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